// verify
Verify a Blockgence document
The documents Blockgence issues (evidence packages, freeze packages, post-mortems, incident deliverables and Monero payment proofs) carry a sha256 fingerprint of their content and an Ed25519 signature of that fingerprint. With this page you can check, without an account and without our code, that a document has not changed and that Blockgence issued it. Updated November 13, 2026.
// the key
The current key
Ed25519, current since November 13, 2026. Its fingerprint (key_id) is the sha256 of the 32
bytes of the public key:
sha256:d8853d1c1b7322b8b7e3bab730fccd0652c0c97a825c3317b3bc705d650f5c5f
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAro3Bpht0HXDL35PmxRYoDKMwaeX3rlBcCqCYszHaW20= -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Download the public key (.pem)
Every signed document carries its own copy of the key in
manifest.integrity.attestations.signature. That copy, on its own, proves nothing: anyone can
strip the signature and sign with another key. What proves that Blockgence issued it is that its
key_id is the one on this page.
// how to verify
How to verify a document
1. The content fingerprint. It is computed with Python 3, with nothing to install: it removes
manifest.integrity, sorts the keys, serializes without spaces in UTF-8 and applies sha256. It
must match manifest.integrity.digest. If it does not, the document has changed.
python3 -c 'import hashlib,json,sys; d=json.load(open(sys.argv[1],encoding="utf-8")); d["manifest"].pop("integrity"); print(hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(d,sort_keys=True,separators=(",",":"),ensure_ascii=False).encode()).hexdigest())' document.json
2. The signature, with the key on this page. It needs OpenSSL 3.0 or later. The macOS
/usr/bin/openssl is LibreSSL and does not read Ed25519 keys: use the Homebrew one. The signed
message is the text blockgence-integrity-v1:sha256: followed by the fingerprint from step 1,
and the signature is the value field of attestations.signature, in base64.
printf '%s' 'blockgence-integrity-v1:sha256:<fingerprint from step 1>' > msg.txt printf '%s' '<value>' | openssl base64 -d -A > sig.bin openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey blockgence-evidencia.pub.pem -rawin -in msg.txt -sigfile sig.bin
It must answer Signature Verified Successfully. Since it is checked against the key downloaded
from this page and not against the one inside the document, a signature made with another key fails
here.
3. Optional: the fingerprint of the document's key. Save its public_key_pem as
pub.pem. This must give the same key_id as above:
openssl pkey -pubin -in pub.pem -outform DER | tail -c 32 | openssl dgst -sha256
Every document also carries the full recipe in manifest.integrity.recipe and in
attestations.signature.verify_openssl.
// what it proves
What the signature proves and what it does not
- It proves that the document was issued by whoever holds Blockgence's private key and that it has not changed since it was signed.
- It does not prove that its content is true or complete. That rests on the methodology, the sources and what the document itself declares it could not see.
- It does not prove the time.
manifest.generated_atis set by the system itself and is not certified by a third party.
// previous keys
Retired and revoked keys
None so far.
A retired key was replaced without being compromised: a document signed with it during its period remains valid. A revoked key was compromised or is suspected to be: no document signed with it is trusted, not even those dated before the revocation, because the document's date is set by the same system that signs.
// if the key changes
If the key changes
If Blockgence replaces the key, the new one appears above as current and the previous one moves to the retired list with its period. If a key is compromised, it becomes revoked with its date and a new one is generated. This page changes in both cases, with its date.